CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with

respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C, and an opinion with respect [*499] to Parts II-D and III, in which JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join., July 3, 1989,

WEBSTER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI, ET AL. v. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES ET AL., No. 88-605, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 492 U.S. 490; 109 S. Ct. 3040; 106 L. Ed. 2d 410; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3290; 57 U.S.L.W. 5023

Both appellants and the United States as amicus curiae have urged that we overrule our decision in Roe v. Wade. Brief for Appellants 12-18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8-24. The facts of the present case, however, differ from those at issue in Roe. Here, Missouri has determined that viability is the point at which its interest in potential human life must be safeguarded. In Roe, on the other hand, the Texas statute criminalized the performance of all abortions, except when the mother's life was at stake. 410 U.S., at 117-118. This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause, id., at 164, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting, , June 26, 2000

CHARLES THOMAS DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES, No. 99-5525, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 530 U.S. 428; 120 S. Ct. 2326; 147 L. Ed. 2d 405; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4305; 68 U.S.L.W. 4566; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5091; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 6789; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3855; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 488

The Court cites Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), as accurately reflecting our standard for overruling, see ante, at 14 -- which I am pleased to accept, even though Patterson was speaking of overruling statutory cases and the standard for constitutional decisions is somewhat more lenient. What is set forth there reads as though it was written precisely with the current status of Miranda in mind:

"In cases where statutory precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress. Where such changes have [*463] removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, . . . or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, . . . the Court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision." 491 U.S. at 173.